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Reference-frame-independent quantum key distribution (RFI QKD) protocol can reduce the re-
quirement on the alignment of reference frames in practical systems. However, comparing with the
Bennett-Brassard (BB84) QKD protocol, the main drawback of RFI QKD is that Alice needs to
prepare six encoding states in the three mutually unbiased bases (X, Y ,and Z), and Bob also needs
to measures the quantum state with such three bases. Here, we show that the RFI QKD protocol can
be secured in the case where Alice sends fewer states. In particular, we find that transmitting three
states (two eigenstates of the Z basis and one of the eigenstates in the X basis) is sufficient to obtain
the comparable secret key rates and the covered distances, even when the security against coherent
attacks with statistical fluctuations of finite-key size is considered. Finally, a proof-of-principle ex-
periment based on time-bin encoding is demonstrated to show the feasibility of our scheme, and its
merit to simplify the experimental setup.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been attract-
ing major attentions due to its higher-level security for
information privacy. Unlike the classical cryptography,
QKD is based on the principles of quantum physics and
one-time pad, which has been proved unconditional se-
cure [1–5]. Secure communication via QKD is one of
important applications of the quantum information sci-
ence, which can be realized with current technologies.
Nowadays, QKD has been studied not only in laborato-
ries [6–11], but also in companies [12]. Some companies
have started making hardware and doing field tests fo-
cused on it [13, 14].
For the practical applications, realistic security of
QKD has been investigated to close the gap between the
assumptions made in the security proofs and the actual
implementations [15–17]. Experimentally, it has been im-
plemented via optical means, achieving key rate of 13.72
megabits per second over 2-dB of standard optical fiber
[18] and of 1.16 bits per hour over 404 km of ultralow-
loss fiber in measurement-device-independent configura-
tion [19]. Most recently, a new scheme was proposed,
which is a promising step towards overcoming the rate-
distance limit of QKD without quantum repeaters and
greatly extending the range of secure quantum communi-
cations [20, 21]. However, reducing the systems complex-
ity is still a vital issue in real-life applications of QKD.
In most QKD systems, a shared reference frame is re-
quired between a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob):
alignment of polarization states for polarization encod-
ing, interferometric stability for phase encoding. Hence,
an active reference frame calibration is needed to en-
sure the achievable secure key rate. Although additional
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alignment parts appear feasible, they will increase the
complexity of practical systems, and even lead to ex-
tra information leakage through these ancillary processes
[22]. Fortunately, a promising scheme, named reference-
frame-independent (RFI) QKD, is proposed to eliminate
the requirement of alignment [23, 24]. In this protocol,
three orthogonal bases (X, Y , and Z) are required to
encode the information, in which the X and Y are used
as monitoring-bases to estimate eavesdropper (Eve)’s in-
formation, and Z basis is generally used to generate the
final key. The states in the Z basis, such as the time-
bin eigen-states, are naturally well-aligned, whereas the
states in X and Y bases are allowed changing slowly in
the quantum channel. Due to this significance, RFI QKD
could be very useful in several scenarios, such as earth-to-
satellite QKD [25] and path-encoded chip-to-chip QKD
[26]. Several theoretical studies and experimental works
have been reported [27–31].
As mentioned above, the RFI QKD protocol needs six
states in the processes of key distribution, whereas only
four states are required in the Bennett-Brassard (BB84)
QKD protocol. If is it possible that we use only four
or even less states to complete the task and meanwhile
keep the merit of RFI QKD protocol? A theoretical
study have explored this possibility, whose advantage is
that doing so may simplify the implementation, e.g., less
randomness is required and possibly fewer optical ele-
ments are need. By exploiting the additional informa-
tion gleaned from the mismatches basis statistics [32–34],
Tamaki et al. [32] showed that three states (two eigen-
states of Z basis and one of the eigenstates each in X)
are enough to secure the BB84 protocol, and Wang et
al. [35] showed that the RFI QKD protocol can be fully
secured using only four states (two eigenstates of Z ba-
sis and one of the eigenstates each in X and Y bases),
and the resulting secret key rate is exactly the same as
the original RFI QKD protocol. Hence, it still needs one
more state compared with the BB84 protocol.
Recently, by adopting the method of convex opti-
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2mization to estimate the Eve’s information, Islam et
al. [36] reduced the number of the state in arbitrary d-
dimensional QKD system. They show that the protocol
can be secure even when using just one monitoring-basis
state as long as the channel noise is low enough. In this
paper, under the assumption of basis-independent state
preparation, we find the number of states required in the
RFI QKD protocol can be further reduced to three states
(two eigenstates of Z basis plus one of the eigenstates in
X basis) by using the semidefinite programming (SDP),
and the secret key rate and transmission distance is still
comparable to the original RFI QKD protocol. We noted
that Bob also need randomly choose one of the X, Y and
Z bases to measure the states sent from Alice, just like
that in the original RFI QKD protocol.
In the following of this paper, we first analyze the se-
curity for the generic RFI QKD protocol against arbi-
trary collective attacks, and then show that this protocol
can be secure when using fewer states. An experimental
demonstration based on time-bin encoding is proceeded
to show the feasibility of our scheme, and its merit to sim-
plify the experimental setup. In the experiment, we also
consider the finite-key security against coherent attacks.
II. PROTOCOL AND SECURITY
We first briefly review the RFI QKD protocol[23]. It
denotes the three Pauli matrices written {σx, σy, σz} by
{X,Y, Z}, and assume the one direction is well defined,
i.e., ZA = ZB . The other two direction are allowed to
change slowly in the quantum channel, that is , XB =
cosβXA + sinβYA and YB = cosβYA − sinβXA. The
meaning of β depends on specific systems, such as the
phase drift between Alice and Bob in time-bin encoding
protocol. Besides, β is unknown and may vary in time.
In each run, Alice (Bob) selects independently one of
the three bases to prepare (measure) the quantum state.
At the end of key distribution, They announce their
bases. The raw keys are distilled from the events when
they both use the well-defined Z basis. The quantum bit
error rate (QBER) is given by
eZZ =
1− 〈ZAZB〉
2
. (1)
According the information collected on the bases comple-
mentary to Z, Alice and Bob can utilize an intermediate
quantity C to estimate Eve’s knowledge. This quantity
is defined as
C = 〈XAXB〉2 + 〈XAYB〉2 + 〈YAXB〉2 + 〈YAYB〉2.(2)
Here, note that C is independent of relative angle β when
plugging the relations XB and YB mentioned above into
Eq. (2). The maximal value under Pauli algebra is C = 2,
in this case, eZZ = 0 as well: the two parameters C and
eZZ are not independent, as we shall see in more detail
later. When eZZ ≤ 15.9%, Eve’s information is given by
IE = (1− eZZ)h
(
1 + µ
2
)
+ eZZh
(
1 + ν (µ)
2
)
, (3)
where h(x) is the binary Shannon entropy, and
µ = min
[√
C/2
1−eZZ , 1
]
,
ν =
√
C/2− (1− eZZ)2µ2
/
eZZ .
(4)
We present this protocol in an equivalent
entanglement-based version where Alice and Bob share
the state of the form |φ〉AB = 1√2 (|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|1〉B).
They independently implement a projective measure-
ment on the entangled state to determine the state
received by the counterpart. This fact, together with
the assumption that it is possible to deal with finite-
dimensional systems, guarantees that the security of the
RFI QKD protocol can be analyzed against arbitrary
collective attacks [37]. Thus, each pair shared by Alice
and Bob is supposed to be in two-qubit state ρAB ,
of which Eve holds a purification ρE = TrAB (ρABE),
where ρABE is the density matrix shared among Alice,
Bob and Eve after the transmission, and the state is
|Ψ〉ABE =
∑
j
√
λj |φ〉AB |Ej〉, where 〈Ei |Ej〉 = δij is
the orthogonal basis of system possessed by Eve.
In RFI QKD, it is obvious that the key ingredient is
trying to obtain an optimal lower bound of C. We cast
it into a minimization-SDP problem [36, 38], where we
use a priori known statistics of the compatible positive-
operator value measure (POVM) of Alice and Bob, and
measurement statistics extracted from the experiment.
In this case, the problem can be converted into getting a
well lower bound of CL under the following constraints
[36]
Tr
(
EˆZZρAB
)
= eZZ , (5)
Tr
(
PˆAαi ⊗ PˆBχjρAB
)
= Pαi,χj , (6)
Tr (ρAB) = 1, (7)
ρAB ≥ 0, (8)
where ∀ {α, χ} ∈ {X,Y, Z} and ∀ {i, j} ∈ {0, 1}. For
four-state scheme, it is noted that i = 0 if α = X or Y .
When three-state scheme is adopted, α 6= Y and i = 0
if α = X. EˆZZ and Pˆi = |i〉 〈i| are, respectively, the
error operator in the Z basis and the projective mea-
surement on the entangled state ρAB . They are well de-
fined according the protocol. The statistics of probabil-
ity Pαi,χj can be extracted from the experiment, which
are the probabilities that Bob receiving a state |χj〉 af-
ter Alice obtained a state |αi〉 by measuring her photon.
Here, the ρAB is allowed to be arbitrary, which means
3Eve can perform any operations on the states transmit-
ted between Alice and Bob, and hence the bound is valid
for any collective attacks respecting the given measure-
ment statistics [36]. This optimization problem can be
efficiently solved by using Matlab package CVX designed
for disciplined convex programming [39, 40]. The detail
of calculations are shown in Appendix A.
FIG. 1. (Color online) (a) The numerically obtained lower
bounds of the CL plotted as a function of the quantum bit
error rates eZZ for the case where Alice sends six, four, and
three states respectively. (b) The lower bounds of CL as a
function of the quantum bit error rates eZZ and misalign-
ments of the reference frame β when only three states are
sent.
To demonstrate our scheme, we treat the bit-flip rates
in the X, Y and Z bases equivalently for simplicity,
i.e., ez = ex = ey = eZZ , which are caused by chan-
nel noise in the transmission. In the original RFI QKD
protocol, Alice needs to randomly prepare six states
|Z0〉, |Z1〉, |X0〉, |X1〉, |Y0〉, and |Y1〉. By using the method
proposed in Ref. [35], the number of states can be reduced
to four, where states |X1〉 and |Y1〉 are redundant to esti-
mate CL. It can be seen from Fig. 1(a) that the method
of optimization applied here correspond to this result, as
CL is the same when Alice sends only four states in com-
parison to the case when she send all six states (red solid
line). Furthermore, our SDP approach is available to es-
timate the lower bound of C when only three states are
sent by Alice, as shown by the solid blue line in Fig. 1(a).
Note that it is still required for Bob to randomly pick one
of three bases X, Y and Z to measure Alice’s three states
|Z0〉, |Z1〉 and |X0〉. In the four-state scenario, complete
knowledge of the remaining unused states can be recon-
structed from the statistics of four used states and from
the statistics of the events where Alice and Bob choose
different basis. However, when Alice sends only three
states, complete knowledge of the non-transmitted states
cannot be reconstructed using the experimentally deter-
mined statistics. Thus, the lower bound of C decreased
faster as eZZ increased. Nonetheless, CL at the three-
state scenario is still independent to the change of β, as
shown in Fig. 1(b), This validates that our scheme is ref-
erence frame independent, even if only X and Z bases
are employed to prepare encoded states.
III. ESTIMATION OF THE SECRET KEY
RATES
After obtaining the value of C, in this section, we es-
timate the key generation rate of RFI QKD using dif-
ferent number of states based on two kinds of source:
single-photon source and phase-randomized weak coher-
ent source (WCS) with vacuum+weak decoy state.
A. Single-photon source
In the original six states RFI QKD protocol, the calcu-
lation of C need applies the equivalent formula of Eq. (2),
it can be written as [24]
C ′ =(1− 2eXX)2 + (1− 2eXY )2
+ (1− 2eY X)2 + (1− 2eY Y )2,
(9)
where eαχ is the phase error rate defined as a fictitious
bit error rate in the α basis and the χ basis. It is a virtual
procedure that Alice first prepares an entanglement state
in the Z basis and then Alice (Bob) measure it in the α
(χ) basis. If there are no basis-dependent source flaws,
the eαχ equals the QBER when Alice prepares her state
in the α basis, and Bob measures it in the χ basis, which
can be directly measured in experiments. For our three
states scheme, only eZZ , eXX , and eXY can be extracted
from the experiment, these parameters as prior known
statistics are sufficient to estimate the lower bound of C,
since the fictious bit error rates eY X and eY Y can be well
bounded using the SDP method, as shown in Appendix
A. After obtaining C and eZZ , we can estimate Eve’s
information IE in Eq. (3) for the RFI QKD protocol.
In an asymptotic case, the secret key rate defined as
the number of bits per pulse is given by
R = 1− h (eZZ)− IE . (10)
By consider the channel model proposed in Ref. [32], we
simulate the secret key rates along with the change of the
transmission distances and eZZ as shown in Fig. 2(a) and
4Fig. 2(b) respectively. For comparison, we also simulate
the key generation rate of three states BB84 protocol us-
ing the SDP approach [36]. When the state-preparation
process is assumed ideal, Eve’s information is estimated
as IE = h (eXX) for the BB84 protocol. The parameters
in our method are set according our experiment system,
i.e., the dark count rate of single photon detector (SPD)
is ed = 8 × 10−6, the detection efficiency is ηd = 13%,
the optical intrinsic error rate is eo = 0.01 and the loss
coefficient of the channel is 0.21 dB/km.
FIG. 2. (Color online) In the case of single-photon source
employed, the secret key rates as a function of the transmis-
sion distances (a) and the quantum bit error rates (b) for the
RFI QKD protocol and the BB84 protocol at the different
misalignment of reference frame.
For the specific case where Alice sends all six states
(Fig. 2(b), solid red line), it is evident that the maximum
error tolerance is ∼ 12.6%, which is in agreement with
existing findings [23]. The error tolerance is defined as
the error rate eZZ beyond which R = 0. Furthermore, we
find that secret key rates are identical when Alice sends
only four states (Fig. 2(a), solid red line) in comparison
to the case when she sends all six states, illustrating that
two of the states are redundant. For the case where Alice
sends only three states, eXX and eXY can be substitute
into our SDP method (shown in Appendix A) to estimate
a low bound of CL. It is evident that the three states RFI
QKD protocol still generates a positive secret key rate, as
illustrated by blue dashed line in Fig. 2, but with a lower
error tolerance (∼ 9.8%). Despite the lower error toler-
ance, we observe that the maximal transmission distance
of the three states RFI QKD protocol is close to that of
the RFI QKD with four and six states and that of the
BB84 protocol when no misalignment of reference frame
occurs. Moreover, at the distances of less than 80 km, it
is evident that their curves are almost overlapped. In the
case of reference frame misalignment, the secret key rates
of the RFI QKD protocol remain the same at different
β whenever six states or three states are sent by Alice.
However, the transmission distance and the secret key
rate of the BB84 protocol are decreased dramatically at
β = pi/4, as shown dotted yellow line in Fig. 2(a). These
results verify that our scheme based on the single-photon
source can release the requirement of the calibration of
reference frame, even when only three states are prepared
by Alice. We noted that Bob still need pick one of the
X, Y , and Z bases to measure the states sent from Alice,
just like that in the original RFI QKD protocol.
B. Phase-randomized WCS with decoy-state
method
The secret key rate calculated above is based on an
ideal single-photon source. However, in most practical
QKD systems, a phase-randomized WCS combined with
decoy-state method is generally employed to overcome
the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack against the
multiphoton pulses [7, 8, 41]. In particular, we assume
that Alice can set the intensity of each laser pulse to one
of the three predetermined intensity levels, K ∈ {µ, ν, ω},
each transmitted with a probability pk. Three intensity
levels satisfy the conditions: µ > ν + ω and 0 ≤ ω ≤ ν.
Furthermore, in the applications, the number of total
pulses N sent by Alice is always finite; thus, we must
consider the effect of statistical fluctuation caused by a
finite size fo pulses to ensure the security of the RFI QKD
protocol.
In such a scenario, we consider the number of pulses
sent by Alice to be N = 1010. The probability of Al-
ice (Bob) preparing (measuring) a state with α basis is
PrA(B)α . Here, we use all intensity levels for the key gen-
eration. According to Ref. [42, 43], the secret key length
against coherent attack is
` = bszz,0 + szz,1 (1− IE)− nzzfh (EZZ)
−log2
2
εEC
− 2log2
1
εPA
−7nzz
√
log2 (2/ε¯)
nzz
− 30log2 (N + 1)
 ,
(11)
where szz,0 and szz,1 are the number of vacuum events
and the number of single-photon events associated with
the single-photon events in ZA respectively. EZZ is the
average of the observed error rate in basis Z, f denotes
5the inefficiency of error correction, nzz is the number of
detected pulses when Alice prepares her state in the Z
basis and Bob measures it in the Z basis. εEC (εPA) de-
notes the probability that error correction (privacy am-
plification) fails, and ε¯ measures the accuracy of estimat-
ing the smooth min-entropy [42]. In this paper, we set
εEC = εPA = ε¯ = ε = 10
−10.
FIG. 3. (Color online) Secret key rate vs. transmission dis-
tances when the weak coherent source is used. (a) Considering
the statistical fluctuations dut to the finite-size pulses, numer-
ically optimized secret key rates against coherent attacks are
obtained for a fixed postprocessing block size N = 1010. The
dot symbols are the experimental results when Alice sends
three states to Bob, and the triangle markers are the results
for the four-states protocol. The green color and the red color
respectively represent β= 0 and β= pi/4. (b) The secret key
rates in the asymptotic case, i.e., in the limit of infinitely large
keys.
Applying the method proposed in Ref. [41], the number
of vacuum events in ZA satisfies
szz,0 ≥ max
[
τ0
(
νn−zz,ω − ωn+zz,ν
)
ν − ω , 0
]
, (12)
where τn :=
∑
k∈K e
−kknpk
/
n! is the probability that
Alice sends a n-photon state, and
n±zz,k := max
[
ek
pk
(
nzz,k ±
√
nzz
2
ln
1
ε
)
, 0
]
(13)
The number of single-photon events in ZA is
szz,1 ≥max
{
τ1µ
µ (ν − ω)− ν2 + ω2 [n
−
zz,ν − n+zz,ω
−ν
2 − ω2
µ2
(
n+zz,µ − szz,0/τ0
)
], 0
}
.
(14)
The QBER eZZ associated with the single-photon events
in ZA is given by
eZZ ≤ min
[
τ1
m+zz,ν −m−zz,ω
(ν − ω) szz,1 ,
1
2
]
, (15)
where
m±zz,k := max
[
ek
pk
(
mzz,k ±
√
mzz
2
ln
1
ε
)
, 0
]
. (16)
We also calculate the number of vacuum events, sκζ,0,
and the number of single-photon events, sκζ,1, for κ =
∪k∈Kκk, where ∀ {κ, ζ} ∈ {X,Y }, i.e., by using Eqs. (12)
and (14) with statistics from the basis κ. In addition, the
formula for the phase error rate of single-photon events
in κAζB is [44]
eκζ ≤ min
{
[e˜κζ + γ (ε, e˜κζ , sκζ,1, szz,1)] ,
1
2
}
, (17)
where e˜κζ can be calculated using Eq. (15), and
γ (a, b, c, d) :=
√
(c+ d) (1− b) b
cd
ln
[
c+ d
2picd (1− b) ba2
]
.
(18)
For the evaluation, we numerically optimize the se-
cret key rate R := `/N over the free parameters{
PrAZ , pu, pv, µ, ν
}
as shown in Fig. 3(a). Due to the
symmetry of the X, Y basis in Eq. (2), we treat the
parameters of the these two bases equivalently for sim-
plicity. Accordingly, PrAX = Pr
B
X = Pr
A
Y = Pr
B
Y , expect
for PrAY = 0 as Alice sent three states to Bob. According
to the experiment system, we set ω = 0 to be a vac-
uum state. For purposes of comparison, the secret key
rates in the asymptotic case are simulated as shown in
Fig. 3(b), and the secret key rates for the BB84 protocol
are also depicted in Fig. 3 by using the blue solid line and
the blue dotted line. In the finite-key case for the BB84
protocol, we adopt the formula proposed in Ref. [41] to
estimate its secret key rates. For the RFI QKD protocol,
the achieved key rates will be the lowest in the finite-key
case at β = pi/4, which can be explained by poor estima-
tion of C with the increase of β. It is evident that the
secret key rates of the RFI QKD protocol are still an or-
der of magnitude higher compared with that of the BB84
protocol at β = pi/4. For the case where Alice only sends
three states, the phase error rates eXX and eXY can be
estimated according to Eq. (17), and they are then taken
into SDP approach to get the value of CL. We show
that the secret key rate and the transmission distance
are comparable with that of the original six states RFI
QKD protocol, which verify the feasibility of our scheme
in the real-world applications.
6IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Schematic of the experiment. PC,
polarization controller; IM, intensity modulator; PM, phase
modulator; PS, phase shifter; ATT, attenuator; D1,D2,
single-photon detector (SPD); QC, an SMF-28 fiber spool,
which has a channel attenuation of α= 0.21dB/km.
To demonstrate the application of our scheme to a real
QKD system, we proceed a proof-of-principle experiment
using time-bin encoding, as shown in Fig. 4. The light
pulses generated by Alice’s coherent light source (1550
nm) are randomly modulated into two intensities of decoy
states using an intensity modulator (IM1). The vacuum
state is generated by stopping the trigger on the laser.
Then, the quantum states of photons are modulated by
an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZ1) to-
gether with IM2 according to the coding information. For
the Z basis, the key bit is encoded in time bin, 0 or 1, by
IM2. For the X and Y bases, the key bit is encoded into
the relative phase, 0 or pi for X basis, and pi/2 or 3pi/2
for Y basis, by phase modulator (PM1). A phase shifter
(PS) in AMZ1 is used to simulate the change of the refer-
ence frame. After pulses passed through the AMZ1, the
time interval of two adjacent pulses is 7 ns. The repe-
tition rate of the system is set to 1 MHz using a digital
waveform generator based on a field-programmable gate
array (FPGA, not shown here for clarity). Light pulses
are then attenuated to the single-photon level by a atten-
uator and transmitted through a quantum channel (QC)
to Bob.
To demodulate the information, Bob needs to make
measurement of the arriving photons on a randomly and
independently selected basis. There are three possible
time-bins of the photons arriving at Bob’s single photon
detectors (SPD). When Bob chooses Z basis to measure
the received photons, the detectors D1 and D2 are re-
spectively aligned at the first and the third time-bin. The
PM2 is used to perform the X or the Y basis measure-
ment, i.e., the phase 0 for X basis measurement, and pi/2
for Y basis measurement. In this case, D1 and D2 are
aligned at the second time-bin.
In the experiment, a higher modulation phase means
that PM requires a higher driven voltage. For the original
six states RFI QKD protocol, three independent signals
need to be combined at a 3 × 1 coupler and the output
signal is then used to drive the PM. The discrepancy
of the arrival times to the PM for these three signals
will lead to state-dependent error rates in the X and Y
bases. Even though only pi/2 needs to modulate in the
case where Alice sends four states to Bob, the inaccurate
value of driven voltage can result in a imperfect phase
value, which will weaken the security of the protocol [35].
In our three states scheme, the above problems can be
avoided, since the PM1 is redundant to prepare a state
|X0〉, which undoubtedly can reduce the complexity of a
real system.
The interference visibility of our system is 97.2%.
Here, the experimental validation with the case where
Alice sends four and three states to Bob is carried out
at the transmission distances of 15 km and 55 km, and
the different misalignments of the reference frame β are
considered. By plugging the experimental counts into the
decoy-state estimations and using Eq. (11), we obtain the
experimental results listed in Table I and Fig. 3(a). The
estimations of CL are obtained by substituting the esti-
mated error rate, i.e., eZZ , eXX , eXY , eY Y ,and eY X , into
the SDP model. The deviations between the simulation
results and the experimental results are primarily due to
the excess loss of 3 dB when Bob measured the received
states with the Z basis. As expected, it is seen that the
secret key rates are almost identical for the four-states
and three-states scheme at the transmission distance of
15 km. The green and the red triangles in Fig. 3(a) re-
spectively denote the experimental results at β = 0 and
β = pi/4 using the four-states scheme; the green and the
red dots respectively represent the results of three-states
scheme at β = 0 and β = pi/4. At the distance of 55
km, the secret key rates for four-states scheme (the trian-
gle symbols) are slightly higher than that of three-states
scheme (the dot symbols).
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, we propose an efficient scheme to real-
ize the RFI QKD by using only three states, which is
identical to the BB84 protocol. Furthermore, the se-
cret key rates and the transmission distance are com-
parable to the original RFI QKD protocol. Experiments
considering the finite-key analysis are demonstrated at
the transmission distance of 15 km and 55 km. Our
scheme is also suitable to the free-space RFI QKD sys-
tems, and can be upgraded to the RFI measurement-
device-independent (MDI) QKD protocol [30] and high-
dimension RFI QKD protocol [27] with simple modifica-
7TABLE I. Implementation parameters and experimental results.
Protocol β
Parameters Estimation Performance
µ ν pµ pν Pr
A
Z szz,0 szz,1 eZZ eXX eXY CL EZZ R
15 km 7.95 dB
Four 0 0.59 0.26 0.59 0.32 0.89 0 1.78× 107 0.83% 4.60% 50% 1.68 0.44% 1.16× 10−3
Three 0 0.58 0.25 0.60 0.31 0.90 0 1.97× 107 0.72% 2.62% 50% 1.77 0.42% 1.42× 10−3
Four pi/4 0.47 0.14 0.43 0.39 0.79 2.18× 104 1.07× 107 0.97% 20.74% 21.15% 1.33 0.61% 4.88× 10−4
Three pi/4 0.44 0.12 0.44 0.39 0.78 1.83× 104 1.00× 107 0.70% 20.39% 19.44% 1.42 0.63% 5.00× 10−4
55 km 16.35 dB
Four 0 0.59 0.28 0.36 0.48 0.82 4.88× 104 2.21× 106 2.08% 6.21% 50% 1.50 1.89% 8.48× 10−5
Three 0 0.55 0.28 0.38 0.42 0.81 7.47× 104 2.00× 106 1.85% 8.20% 50% 1.34 2.30% 5.02× 10−5
Four pi/4 0.43 0.15 0.22 0.47 0.62 5.50× 104 7.25× 105 1.32% 23.36% 23.41% 1.13 3.90% 8.36× 10−6
Three pi/4 0.39 0.12 0.23 0.45 0.59 5.20× 104 5.40× 105 1.71% 21.76% 21.56% 1.23 4.25% 4.98× 10−6
tions to the setup, thereby reducing the complexity of
these systems.
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Appendix A: Explicit calculation for CL
The estimation of lower bound of C can be turned into
an optimization framework [36]. In an equivalent entan-
glement distillation version, Alice prepares an entangled
state of the form
|φ〉AB =
1√
2
(|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|1〉B) , (A1)
where she chooses one of photons to measure either
in
{
σAX , σ
A
Y , σ
A
Z
}
, the other one is then sent to Bob,
who chooses to measure in
{
σBX , σ
B
Y , σ
B
Z
}
. According to
Eq. (2), the optimization problem is
minimize : CL =
∑
κ,ζ
Tr
(
σAκ ⊗ σBζ ρAB
)2
, (A2)
where ∀ {κ, ζ} ∈ {X,Y }. We are allowing ρAB to be arbi-
trary, which implies that Eve can perform any arbitrary
operations on the states transmitted between Alice and
Bob, and hence the bound is valid for any collective at-
tacks.
Based on Eq. (1), the error operator in the Z basis is
given by
eˆZZ =
1
2
(
1 ⊗ 1 − σAZ ⊗ σBZ
)
. (A3)
Except for the case when Alice use the Y basis to prepare
her states, the probabilities Pαi,χj can be simulated by
Pαi,χj =
1
2
[
(1− eα)
∣∣〈αAi ∣∣ χBj 〉∣∣2 + eα∣∣〈αAi⊕1∣∣ χBj 〉∣∣2] ,
(A4)
where α ∈ {X,Z} , χ ∈ {X,Y, Z}, and the symbol ⊕
denotes the modulo two addition. The factor 1/2 is the
conditional probability that the state
∣∣αAi 〉 is sent, given
that it is prepared in α basis. eα is the bit-flip rate of
state
∣∣αAi 〉, which is caused by the channel noise along the
transmission. In Eq. (A4), the first (second) term models
the probability that Bob detects a state
∣∣χBj 〉 after he
received a state
∣∣αAi 〉 (∣∣αAi⊕1〉) sent from Alice.
Due to 〈σY ⊗ σY 〉 = −1 for the state |φ〉AB , Alice
actually sends Bob a state |Yi⊕1〉 after she got a state |Yi〉
in the equivalent entanglement-based protocol. Thus, the
the probabilities PYi,χj , when Alice sends states in Y
basis, should be given by
PYi,χj =
1
2
[
ey
∣∣〈Y Ai ∣∣ χBj 〉∣∣2 + (1− ey) ∣∣〈Y Ai⊕1∣∣ χBj 〉∣∣2] .
(A5)
The QBERs eZZ , eXX , eXY , eY X , and eY Y can be
extracted from the experiment, but not all of them equal
to the corresponding bit-flip error rate as β 6= 0. Here,
we assume that they are all less than 0.5 (if not, Bob can
simply flip his bits). For the convenience of experiment
and simulation, we list the probabilities Pαi,χj in detail
8FIG. 5. (Color online) The upper bound on the phase error
rates eY Y and eYX plotted as a function of the quantum error
rates eZZ when Alice sends six, four, and three states to Bob.
as follows:
PZi,κj =
1
4
;Pκi,Zj =
1
4
;
PXi,Xi =
1
4
[1 + cosβ (1− 2ex)] = 1
2
(1− eXX) ;
PXi,Yi =
1
4
[1− sinβ (1− 2ex)] = 1
2
eXY ;
PYi,Yi =
1
4
[1− cosβ (1− 2ey)] = 1
2
eY Y ;
PYi,Xi =
1
4
[1− sinβ (1− 2ey)] = 1
2
eY X ;
PXi,Xj 6=i =
1
4
[1− cosβ (1− 2ex)] = 1
2
eXY ;
PXi,Yj 6=i =
1
4
[1 + sinβ (1− 2ex)] = 1
2
(1− eXX) ;
PYi,Yj 6=i =
1
4
[1 + cosβ (1− 2ey)] = 1
2
(1− eY Y ) ;
PYi,Xj 6=i =
1
4
[1 + sinβ (1− 2ey)] = 1
2
(1− eY X) .
(A6)
When the RFI QKD protocol with three states is ap-
plied, the fictious bit error rates eY X and eY Y can also
be well bounded using the follows optimization problem:
maximize : eY X = Tr
(
EˆY XρAB
)
;
maximize : eY Y = Tr
(
EˆY Y ρAB
)
,
(A7)
where
EˆY X =
1
2
(
1 ⊗ 1 − σAY ⊗ σBX
)
,
EˆY Y =
1
2
(
1 ⊗ 1 − σAY ⊗ σBY
)
.
(A8)
In Fig. 5, we show the dependence of eY X and eY Y on
eZZ when Alice transmits different states at β = 0 (solid
lines) and β = pi/4 (dashed lines). In simulations, it is
noted that we treat the bit-flip rates in different bases
equivalently for simplicity, i.e., ez = ex = ey = eZZ . It
is evident that for sending six and four states at β = 0,
eZZ = eY Y and eY X = 0.5, as respectively indicated by
the red solid line and black solid line. This is expected
for RFI QKD protocol when no misalignment of refer-
ence frame occurs. However, the phase error rate eY X
and eY Y increase faster when Alice sends three states,
resulting in lower CL as shown in Fig. 1(a) and lower
error tolerance as shown in Fig. 2(b).
Appendix B: Channel model
1. For the single-photon source
We consider the channel model proposed by Ref. [32,
35], where the conditional probability that Bob obtain
j when he chooses χ basis for measurement given that
Alice sent him the state |αi〉 can be written as
Vχj |αi =ηTχj |αi (1− ed) + (1− η) ed (1− ed)
+
1
2
[
ηed + (1− η) e2d
]
,
(B1)
where ed is the dark count rate of SPD and η denotes the
total transmittance of the system. The term Tχj |αi is the
theoretical probability that Bob measures the state |αi〉
and obtains the bit value j when he chooses χ basis. It
is calculated by
Tχj |αi = |〈αi| χj〉|2. (B2)
Then the single-photon gain and the QBER are given by,
respectively,
Q1αχ =
1
2
(
Vχ0|α0 + Vχ1|α1 + Vχ1|α0 + Vχ0|α1
)
,
E1αχ = min
[
E˜1αχ, 1− E˜1αχ
]
,
(B3)
where
E˜1αχ = eo
(
1− 2e1αχ
)
+ e1αχ,
e1αχ =
Vχ1|α0 + Vχ0|α1
2Q1αχ
.
(B4)
The factor 1/2 in Eq. (B3) denotes the probability of
Alice preparing quantum states |α0〉 or |α1〉, and eo in
Eq. (B4) is the optical intrinsic error rate [45, 46]. For
simplicity, we assume E1αχ ≤ 0.5 in Eq. (B3), if not, either
Alice or Bob flips her or his bit strings to make it hold.
2. For the WCS with decoy technique
In this case, according to the decoy state method [35],
the overall gain, given that Alice sends a state |αi〉 using
k ∈ K intensity and Bob obtains a state |χj〉, can be
9written as
Qk,αi,χj =
∞∑
n=0
Yn
kn
n!
e−k
=
1
2
{
1+D
[
e(−η+a)k − e−ak −De−ηk
]}
,
(B5)
where we use the notations
a = ηTχj |αi , D = 1− ed. (B6)
According to the above formula, we can obtain the overall
gain, the overall error gain, and the averge of observed
error rate in the α basis. They are given by, respectively
Qkαχ =
1
2
(Qk,α0,χ0 +Qk,α1,χ0 +Qk,α1,χ1 +Qk,α0,χ1) ,
W kαχ = eo
(
Qkαχ − 2W˜ kαχ
)
+ W˜ kαχ,
Ekαχ = min
[
E˜kαχ, 1− E˜kαχ
]
,
(B7)
where
W˜ kαχ =
1
2
(Qk,α1,χ0 +Qk,α0,χ1) ,
E˜kαχ = W
k
αχ
/
Qkαχ.
(B8)
Considering the probabilities that Alice prepares her
state in the α basis, PrAα , its mean photon number k,
pk, and Bob measures this state in the χ basis, Pr
B
χ , we
can calculated the number of detected pulses, nαχ,k and
the number of bit errors, mαχ,k, when Alice prepares her
state in the α basis with intensity k and Bob measures it
in the χ basis. They are given by
nαχ,k = Npk
A
Pr
α
B
Pr
χ
Qkαχ,
mαχ,k = Npk
A
Pr
α
B
Pr
χ
W kαχ.
(B9)
Thus, the overall number of detected pulses and the over-
all number of bit errors for all intensity levels are
nαχ =
∑
k∈K nαχ,k,
mαχ =
∑
k∈K mαχ,k.
(B10)
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